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I. INTRODUCTION
A prisoner finishes his first serving of ice cream and demands another. Prison
guards inform the prisoner they cannot permit a second serving. In response, the
prisoner throws a tantrum, screaming and yelling. The guards, in an effort to quiet
the prisoner and keep order in the prison, gather the prisoner’s arms behind him. The
prisoner, still ranting and raving, resists the restraint by flinging his arms and legs in
every direction and striking the guards. In doing so, the prisoner bumps his head,
causing a lump and bruise. This sounds ridiculous – A grown man ranting and
raving for a second serving of ice cream. Perhaps, but what is more ridiculous is
what followed – a lawsuit against the prison guards claiming they exerted excessive
force upon the prisoner. This situation is what Congress refers to as “frivolous
prisoner litigation.”1
Because of situations like the one above, the federal courts experienced a
dramatic increase in prisoner litigation. From 1980 to 1996, petitions filed by state
and federal prisoners nearly tripled, from 23,230 to 68,235.2 Yet, the courts
dismissed 62% of these prisoners’ petitions and less than 2% of such petitions were
adjudicated in favor of the prisoner.3 Because of lack of legal merit, these prisoner
lawsuits proved to be frivolous and extremely burdensome on the federal judiciary.4
As a result, Congress was faced with the need to balance the prisoners’ right to

1

This a fabricated story fashioned after the facts presented in Lyell v. Schachle, No. 1-950035, 1996 WL 391557, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 1996).
2
JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRISONER PETITIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS,
1980-1996: FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS PROGRAM, 1 (1974).
3

Id.

4
See Lyell, 1996 WL 391557, at *1 (arguing cruel and unusual punishment arose out of a
denial of a second serving of ice cream) (“this case is illustrative of what gives prisoner
litigation a bad odor”); Rudd v. Jones, 879 F. Supp. 621, 622 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (claiming that
courts are “drowning in frivolous prisoner complaints”); Scher v. Purkett, 758 F. Supp. 1316,
1316-17 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff’d, 62 F.3d 1421 (8th Cir. 1995) (arguing a denial of shampoo
and deodorant is a violation of a prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights) (“Scher files these suits
to harass the defendants and provide a source of amusement for himself.”); Cotner v.
Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Okla. 1985) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom
Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986) (“the sheer volume of these prisoners’ cases
causes extreme frustration and hardship”); Eugene J. Kuzinski, Note, The End of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 361 (1998) (“the PLRA is a necessary
Congressional measure designed to rectify serious problems surrounding the federal courts’
involvement with state prison inmates”); see also 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995). Senator
Dole mentions a number of prisoner claims that were apparently frivolous in nature, such as
suits involving “insufficient storage locker space, a defective haircut by a prisoner barber, the
failure of prison officials to invite a prisoner to a pizza party for a departing prison employee,
and yes, being served chunky peanut butter instead of the creamy variety.” Id.
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judicial inquiry, and the taxpayers’ interest in reducing costs associated with these
frivolous claims.5
To alleviate the burden of prisoners’ claims on the federal courts, Congress
amended the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (hereinafter CRIPA)6 in
1996.7 The amended Act, now referred to as the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
(hereinafter PLRA),8 places firmer limits on inmates’ access to the courts.9 Despite
the PLRA and Congress’ intention to reduce the burden of prisoner litigation on the
federal court system, these limits created considerable litigation regarding the Act’s
application.10 More specifically, the PLRA’s requirement of administrative

5

141 CONG. REC. 26,449 (1995) (relying on the National Association of Attorneys
General’s estimations that frivolous prisoner litigation has cost the taxpayers close to $81.3
million); 141 CONG. REC. 26,553 (1995) (“It is time to stop this ridiculous waste of the
taxpayers’ money. The huge costs imposed on State governments to defend against these
meritless suits is another kind of crime committed against law-abiding citizens.”).
6
Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1994
& Supp. V 1999).
7

Senator Dole, joined with Senators Hatch, Kyl, Abraham, Hutchison, Reid, Thurmond,
Specter, Santorum, D’Amato, Gramm, and Bond, introduced the PLRA as amendments to the
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act “to address the alarming explosion in the number
of frivolous lawsuits filed by State and Federal prisoners.” 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995).
Senator Dole noted that the overabundance of frivolous prisoner lawsuits “tie up the courts,
waste valuable legal resources, and affect the quality of justice enjoyed by law-abiding
citizens.” Id.
8
Congress amended the CRIPA in 1996 with a set of amendments known as the Prison
Litigation Reform Act. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1932,
1346, 42 U.S.C. 1997 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
The applicable amendment regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies will be
referred to as the PLRA or section 1997e(a) as codified in the United States Code. This
section will be cited as 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
Throughout this Note, the CRIPA prior to the amendments will be referred to as the
CRIPA. The relevant section prior to the amendments was designated as § 7(a) in the CRIPA.
Hereinafter, citations to this CRIPA section will be omitted and the United States Code will be
used to cite to the old version of § 1997e(a)(1) (cited as 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994)).
9
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Id. at § 1932; Id. at § 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). These
limits include: (1) excluding lawsuits filed by prisoners who previously had three petitions
dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a cause of action; (2) annulling release
credit earned by a prisoner because the prisoner filed a frivolous claim; (3) allowing sua
sponte dismissals of any claims that fail to state a cause of action; and (4) requiring prisoners
to exhaust administrative remedies regarding “prison conditions” before filing suit. Id.
10
See Booth v. Churner, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (2001) (holding that under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a), a prisoner seeking only monetary damages must complete any prison
administrative remedies even if the process does not make specific provisions for monetary
relief); Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter v.
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001) (holding that section 1997e(a)’s requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply to claims of excessive force); Smith v. Zachary, 255
F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that section 1997e(a) states that administrative
remedies must be exhausted before filing suit in court claiming excessive force).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002

3

132

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:129

exhaustion in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) caused particular problems for the courts
regarding prisoners’ excessive force claims brought under the Eighth Amendment. 11
Section 1997e(a) provides that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.”12 The conflict regarding excessive force
claims centers on the statutory phrase “prison conditions.”13 As a result, an intense
dispute among the circuits surfaced regarding whether excessive force claims made
by inmates are “prison conditions” under 1997e(a), ultimately requiring prisoners to
exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court.14
This Note addresses this issue and recommends that excessive force claims be
subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, thereby requiring an inmate to
exhaust administrative remedies before filing an excessive force suit in federal court.
Requiring exhaustion for excessive force claims will help solve the problems
associated with the overabundance of frivolous prisoner litigation and the federal
judiciary’s unnecessary interference into the nation’s prison administrations.
Moreover, the excessive force issue is in the forefront because the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Porter v. Nussle,15 a case dealing exclusively with this issue.
The lower court, in Nussle v. Willette,16 allowed an inmate plaintiff’s excessive force
claim even though the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.17 This
decision caused a kink in what seemed to be a consensus among the United States
Appellate Courts’ requiring exhaustion. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Porter may provide the possible conclusion to a debate that began in the courts with
the PLRA.
Part II of this Note begins by identifying the amendments of the PLRA, as well
as the justifications for these amendments. Part III illustrates the split among the
circuits regarding the applicability of excessive force claims to the exhaustion
requirement. The discussion begins at Part IV, which asserts that the exhaustion
requirement includes claims of excessive force. In making this determination, Part
IV defines the phrase “prison conditions” and discusses the applicability of an
excessive force claim to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Next, this Part
11
Compare Nussle, 224 F.3d at 106, Baskerville v. Goord, No. 97 Civ. 6413, 1998 WL
292421, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1998), White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305, 316 (D.N.J.
1998), and Johnson v. O’Malley, No. 96 Civ. 6598, 1998 WL 292421, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 19,
1998) (finding exhaustion required), with Smith, 255 F.3d at 452, Higginbottom v. Carter, 223
F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000), Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 298 (3d Cir. 2000), aff’d
on other grounds, 532 U.S. 731 (2001), Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir.
1999), Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998), Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263,
1265 (10th Cir. 1997), and Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding exhaustion required).
12

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).

13

See supra note 11.

14

See id.

15

532 U.S. 1065 (2001).

16

224 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2000).

17

Id.
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proposes that the purpose and legislative history of the PLRA support a conclusion
that excessive force claims are encompassed by the exhaustion requirement. Part IV
continues with a discussion of Supreme Court cases, which confirm that the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement includes claims of excessive force. Finally, this Part
contends that the most efficient and effective process for the prisoner, as well as for
the prison systems and federal judiciary, is to require exhaustion of excessive force
claims. This Note concludes that requiring exhaustion of excessive force claims is
the appropriate solution to the serious problems that plague the federal court system
and the nation’s prison administrations. Therefore, the Supreme Court should
reverse the Second Circuit’s decision in Nussle v. Willette, and hold that excessive
force claims are “prison conditions,” and therefore, subject to the exhaustion
requirement of section 1997e(a).
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISONER LITIGATION REFORM ACT
Following the enactment of the CRIPA in 1980, federal courts encountered
massive numbers of frivolous lawsuits, which proved greatly burdensome on the
federal judiciary.18 Additionally, these lawsuits led to substantial legal costs
associated with taxpayer dollars.19 Moreover, the federal judiciary was interfering
tremendously with the orderly administration of the nation’s prisons.20 To remedy
these serious concerns, Congress proposed amendments to the CRIPA, the Prisoner
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which was signed into law by President Clinton on
April 26, 1996.21
A. The Need for the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
From 1980 to 1996, federal courts experienced an alarming increase in prisoner
litigation. Within 16 years, petitions filed by prisoners swelled by nearly 300%,
from 23,230 to 68,235.22 Specifically, in 1994, inmates filed over 39,000 lawsuits,
an alarming 15% rise in suits filed the previous year.23 More astonishingly, the
greater part of these suits completely lacked legal merit.24 In 1994, nearly “94.7% of
the lawsuits were dismissed before the pre-trial phase, and only a scant 3.1% have
enough validity to reach trial.”25
The increase in the number of suits, 95% of which proved to be meritless, was a
major concern for all involved, even the prisoners.26 These concerns regarding

18

See supra note 4, and accompanying text.

19

See supra note 5, and accompanying text.

20

See 141 CONG. REC. 35,980 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,554 (1995); 141 CONG. REC.
26,448 (1995).
21

See supra note 8, and accompanying text.

22

SCALIA, supra note 2.

23

141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995).

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 26,548, 26,553. Senator Dole, along with eleven other Senators, introduced the
PLRA to curb the amount of frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners. Dole also presented a letter
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frivolous lawsuits were not based solely on statistics. Concerns also arose after the
public became aware of specific examples of outlandish suits filed by prisoners.27
Senator Robert Dole noted that frivolous lawsuits involved such grievances as:
providing insufficient locker space, giving a defective haircut, not inviting an inmate
to a pizza party, and even being served chunky peanut butter instead of creamy. 28
Senator Orrin Hatch also pointed out some noteworthy examples. One inmate filed a
frivolous suit because the prison issued Converse shoes, rather than the more stylish
Reebok or L.A. Gear shoes.29 Another case involved an inmate who deliberately
flooded his cell, and then sued the prison officials who cleaned up the flood for
getting his Pinochle cards wet.30
Congress was not alone in its concern; the federal courts also commented on
frivolous prisoner litigation.31 As explained earlier, in Lyell v. Schachle, the
written by the National Association of Attorneys General thanking him for his efforts in
introducing the PLRA. Id.
27

In 1995, a number of articles were published regarding frivolous prisoner suits. See
Sandra Ann Harris, Prisoners’ Lawsuits Swamp Federal Courts, THE NEWS TRIBUNE, Oct. 26,
1996, at D10; Prisoner Litigation Reform Act Clears Congress; Orrin Hatch, GOV’T PRESS
RELEASES (Fed. Document Clearing House, Inc., Washington D.C.) Apr. 26, 1996; Dennis C.
Vacco et al., Letter to the Editor, Free the Courts From Frivolous Prisoner Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1995, at A26.
Additionally, prisoners filed frivolous suits all over the country. See Lyell v. Schachle,
No. 1-95-0035, 1996 WL 391557 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 1996) (arguing cruel and unusual
punishment arose out of a denial of a second serving of ice cream); Jones v. Warden of the
Statesville Corr. Ctr., 918 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (claiming male inmates should have
the same rights as women inmates and should be allowed access to bras and panties); Scher v.
Purkett, 758 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff’d, 62 F.3d 1421 (8th Cir. 1995) (arguing a
denial of shampoo and deodorant is a violation of a prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights); Foy
v. Dunleavy, Civ. A. No. 87-4897, 1987 WL 28399 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 1987) (complaining the
prison’s failure to repair the photocopier denies prisoners “access to the courts and a lawyer”).
28

141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995).

29

Id. at 26,553.

30

Id.

31

See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 211 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“with
less to profitably occupy their time than potential litigants on the outside, and with a justified
feeling that they have much to gain and virtually nothing to lose, prisoners appear to be far
more prolific litigants than other groups in the population”); Rudd v. Jones, 879 F. Supp. 621,
622 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (“It is . . . clearly obvious that many inmates and their sometimes
almost professional jailhouse writ writers have abused the process merely to go through the
exercise, challenge the system again, or get a trip out of the penitentiary for a court hearing”);
Yocum v. Dixon, 729 F. Supp. 616, 616 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (“This case illustrates the problem
confronting a district court when a prisoner has too much free time and chooses to free that
time by inundating the Court with frivolous pro se pleadings and motions.”); James v.
Quinlan, 886 F.2d 37, 41 n.5 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Gabel v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 124, 125 n.1
(5th Cir. 1988)) (“setting forth statistics that ‘suggest that pro se civil rights litigation has
become a recreational activity for state prisoners in our Circuit’”); Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F.
Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Okla. 1985) aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom Cotner v. Hopkins,
795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986) (“These complaints are but further examples of [Cotner’s]
malicious intent to disrupt the courts and make others pay for his mistakes”); Gast v. Daily,
577 F. Supp. 14, 15 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (“it must be stressed that the Court is not a
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prisoner-plaintiff filed a complaint because he was denied a second serving of ice
cream.32 Writing for the majority, Judge Higgins noted that the case was “illustrative
of what gives prisoner litigation a bad odor.”33 Judge Higgins went on to explain
that the judicial system would be ridiculed if he put six law-abiding, taxpaying
citizens in the jury box to hear an ice cream case.34 Judge Higgins told the plaintiff
to “grow up and do his time and take his punishment like a man.”35
Scher v. Purkett 36 is another example of the courts’ fury with prisoners filing
frivolous lawsuits. In that case, a prisoner filed a complaint alleging that the
deprivation of shampoo and deodorant is cruel and unusual punishment.37 The
prisoner alleged that he was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.”38 The court found the prisoner filed suit to harass the defendants and to
amuse himself.39 Judge Limbaugh, not amused, responded, “[t]he Court is poised to
demonstrate just how vexed it has become with malcontent inmates who fill their
idle time, and the Court’s precious time, by filing § 1983 complaints about the petty
deprivations inherent in prison life.”40
Some inmates are notorious for the number of frivolous lawsuits they have filed
during their incarceration.41 In Scher, the court listed twenty cases filed by the
prisoner, and called him “a frequent filer of prisoner civil rights suits.”42 Judge
Limbaugh responded to Scher’s 21st complaint by criticizing his malicious use of the
judicial system and stripping Scher of his ability to file any more suits.43
The most notorious prisoner-plaintiff, however, would have to be the “Reverend”
Clovis Carl Green, Jr., who has filed over 700 lawsuits.44 One judge sarcastically
correspondence school for creative writing”); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1316-17
(D. Or. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th
Cir. 1984) (“True to his calling, Franklin has filed a civil rights complaint in this court every
time somebody does something he does not like.”).
32

Lyell, No. 1-95-0035, 1996 WL 391557, at *1.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Scher v. Purkett, 758 F. Supp. 1316, 1317 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff’d, 62 F.3d 1421 (8th Cir.
1986).
37

Id. at 1316.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 1317.

40

Scher, 758 F. Supp. at 1317.

41

Harry Franklin is an inmate notorious for filing frivolous lawsuits. See Franklin v.
Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (D. Or. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Franklin
v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating “only the finality of death,” either the
Judge’s or Franklins’, would end the Judge’s torment of “the Harry Franklin saga”).
42

Scher, 758 F. Supp. at 1317.

43

Id.

44

For a list of over 500 suits filed by Green within only seven years see Green v. Camper,
477 F. Supp. 758, 759-68 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
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remarked that the Guinness Book of World Records does not contain a category for
the most lawsuits filed by an individual; therefore, it is difficult to award Green the
title.45
Not only do frivolous lawsuits infuriate the judges, but they waste courts’
precious time and crowd the federal dockets. There is no question that prisoner
litigation is an important segment of any docket.46 Prisoner lawsuits represented
nearly 25% of all civil suits filed in federal court.47 In particular, in 1994 over 45%
of all federal civil complaints filed in Arizona were state prisoners’ complaints.48
Hence, 20,000 Arizona inmates filed nearly the same amount of complaints as the
3.5 million citizens of Arizona.49
The volume of these cases frustrated and infuriated anyone who dealt with
them.50 Prison officials were limited by the funds appropriated to them, yet they
were bombarded by the long lists of prisoner demands requesting such things as law
libraries, legal clerks, sufficient prisoner access to libraries and courts, copying
facilities, and mailing privileges.51 Moreover, prison officials were constantly
defending themselves against threats of frivolous lawsuits filed by inmates seeking
revenge.52 Court clerks were also affected by the enormous amount of frivolous
prisoner claims.53 These clerks filed and indexed hundreds of prisoner petitions,
issued summons to all named parties, and shuffled and deciphered through the stacks
of legal papers that followed.54 After the court clerks completed their jobs, the
deputy court clerks noted each and every document into a docket sheet, which was
filed, indexed, and stored in facilities already subjected to overcrowding by the
abundance of other lawsuits.55 The torch was then passed to the state attorneys who
struggled to understand the vague pleadings.56 Finally, the judges, magistrates, and
law clerks grappled with the nonconforming, and sometimes illegible, or even

45

Green v. Arnold, 512 F. Supp. 650, 651 n.4 (W.D. Tex. 1981).

46
Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Okla. 1985) aff’d in part, vacated in
part sub nom, Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986) (relying on Federal Court
Management Statistics, p.129 (Admin. Office of the United States Courts, 1984)) (stating that
the United States District Courts heard 31,307 prisoner claims, which is around 10% of all
civil suits filed); 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (stating that 45% of all civil cases filed in Arizona
are prisoner lawsuits); Id. at 26,543 (stating that 22% of all civil cases filed in Utah are
prisoner lawsuits); see also HARRIS, supra note 27, at D10; VACCO, supra note 27, at A26.
47

141 CONG. REC. 14,572 (1995).

48

141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995).

49

Id.

50

See Cotner, 618 F. Supp. at 1095.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

See Cotner, 618 F. Supp. at 1095-96.

55

Id. at 1096.

56

Id.
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incomprehensible pleadings of the prisoners.57 The time spent completing these
judicial tasks was overly burdensome upon the courts that serve to provide justice
not only for the prisoners, but also for other citizens of the United States.58
Along with exploiting the federal docket, defending frivolous lawsuits wasted
society’s tax dollars. For instance, a lawsuit filed by a prisoner alleging the right to
practice martial arts in prison had an estimated systemwide cost of $28,000.59 More
astonishing was a case where the prisoner claimed a violation of constitutional rights
because he did not receive five free stamped envelopes.60 This suit cost the system
$151,000.61 The prisoners did not pay one penny for either of these California
lawsuits.62 These bills were footed by the law-abiding, taxpaying citizens of
California.63
Thirty-three states have estimated that civil rights suits filed by prisoners cost
these states combined at least $54.5 million each year.64 Using this figure, experts
have estimated that civil rights suits cost the fifty states, collectively, $81.3 million
annually.65 This means that the citizens of the United States are dishing out over $81
million dollars to pay for prisoner lawsuits that, 95% of the time, are found
meritless.66 Filing frivolous lawsuits is just another type of crime prisoners commit
against the public. As Senator Hatch stated: “these prisoners are victimizing society
twice – first when they commit the crime that put them in prison, and second when
they waste our hard-earned tax dollars.”67
When Congress enacted the PLRA, it was not only concerned with frivolous
lawsuits, wasting of taxpayers’ dollars, and crowding of dockets. Congress also
intended to curtail the federal judiciary’s micromanagement of state prison systems.68
By rendering constant decisions regarding conditions of confinement, the federal

57
Id; see also Rudd v. Jones, 879 F. Supp. at 621, 623 (S.D. Miss. 1995). In this case, the
court dismissed the prisoner’s complaint because it “is a confusing, rambling petition that is
barely coherent” and will not survive the proceedings of a trial. Id.
58

Cotner, 618 F. Supp. at 1096.

59

HARRIS, supra note 27, at D10.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

HARRIS, supra note 27, at D10.

64

141 CONG. REC. 38276 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,553 (1995) (Letter by National
Association of Attorneys General); 141 CONG. REC. 26,448-49 (1995).
65

141 CONG. REC. 38276 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,553 (1995) (Letter by National
Association of Attorneys General); 141 CONG. REC. 18, 26449 (1995).
66

141 CONG. REC. 38,276 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 35,980 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,553
(1995) (Letter by the National Association of Attorneys General); 141 CONG. REC. 26,449
(1995).
67

141 CONG. REC. 26,553 (1995).

68

141 CONG. REC. 35,980 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,554 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,448
(1995); see also Kuzinski, supra note 4, at 361.
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judiciary was ordering the nation’s prison systems to follow numerous guidelines.69
Soon, there were so many judicial decrees that it was becoming virtually impossible
for the prison administrations to run the prisons without coming in contact with a
judicial order.70 As a result, the federal judiciary was literally running the prisons
from the courtroom.71 Oklahoma Attorney General Drew Edmondson summed it up
in these words – “It’s time the federal government got out of the business of running
state prison facilities on a day-to-day basis.”72 Federal judges had literally seized
control of the correctional institutions. In 1990, over 1,200 state prison systems were
operating under the supervision of the federal judiciary in some form, and over forty
states had some type of order overseeing aspects of prison administration.73 For
example, New York City was subjected to judicial restraint in nearly every aspect of
prison conditions when it entered into a fifty-seven page consent decree in 1978.74
The consent decree, expanding to an astonishing 1,500 pages in 18 years, modified
something as simple as the number of forks, knives, spoons, and “spoodles” that
every prison kitchen must supply.75
The number of frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners, the overburdened federal
dockets, the wasting of taxpayer dollars, and the micromanagement over prison
systems were all concerns that plagued the federal legislatures, as well as the federal
judiciary, prison systems, and citizens of the United States. As a result of these
concerns, a number of Senators proposed several amendments to the CRIPA, and on
April 26, 1996, the PLRA was enacted.76
B. The Amended Language of 1997e(a)
Congress enacted, and the President signed the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act in
an effort to prevent frivolous lawsuits, overburden on courts, waste of taxpayer
dollars, and judicial interference.77 Four specific amendments created by the PLRA
made it more difficult for prisoners to bring their complaints to federal courts.
First, absent a showing of imminent danger of serious physical harm, the Act bars
suits by inmate-plaintiffs who had previously filed three petitions dismissed as

69
Review & Outlook: Criminal Oversight, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1996, at A18 (hereinafter
Criminal Insight).
70

See id.

71

See id.

72

Barbara Hoberock, Prisoners’ Suit Against State is Sent Back to 10th Circuit, TULSA
WORLD, Oct. 8, 1996, at A7.
73

See Criminal Oversight, supra note 69, at A18.

74
The Role of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice in Implementing the Prison Litigation Reform Act:
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. Senate, 104th Cong. 55-56 (1997) (statement
of Laura A. Chamberlain).
75

Id.

76

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Id. at § 1932; Id. at § 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

77

See generally Criminal Insight, supra note 69.
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frivolous, malicious, or a failure to state a cause of action.78 Second, the Act revokes
a prisoner’s earned release credit if he files a frivolous claim.79 Third, the Act allows
sua sponte dismissals of any claim that fails to state a cause of action.80 Finally, and
most importantly, the Act amended section 1997e(a) to require prisoners to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to bringing suits regarding “prison conditions” to
federal court.81
Exhaustion of administrative remedies requires parties to avail themselves of all
potential solutions within the appropriate agency before asking the court to make a
decision “on an adverse administrative determination.”82 When enacting the PLRA,
Congress required exhaustion because it precludes the federal judiciary from
intruding on a prison’s administrative process until it has reached a solution.83 Also,
exhaustion allows prison administrations to apply their expertise and discretion,
cultivate factual records, and perhaps, settle prisoner conflicts without judicial
involvement.84
Keeping these attributes of exhaustion in mind, Congress made three significant
changes to the exhaustion requirement. First, section 1997e(a) now requires a
prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court,
whereas, prior to the PLRA, the federal judiciary used its discretion in applying the

78
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Section 1915(g) was more commonly known as “three strikes
rule.” In addition to an amendment that requires all inmates to pay the court’s filing fee,
section 1915(g) was created to deter prisoners from repeatedly filing frivolous complaints.
Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and You’re Out of Court –
It May Be Effective, But is it Constitutional?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 471 (1997).

Prior to the enactment of the PLRA, federal courts were extremely concerned by the
amount of frivolous litigation filed by specific prisoners. Recall the Scher case in which Judge
Limbaugh announced his disapproval with “frequent filer[s] of prisoner civil rights suits.”
Scher v. Purkett, 758 F. Supp. at 1316, 1316-17 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff’d, 62 F.3d 1421 (8th Cir.
1995).
79

28 U.S.C. § 1932.

80

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

81

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Section 1997e (a) states “No action shall
be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id.
82

5 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 49.01, at 49-3 (2001); Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (“No one is entitled to judicial
relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been
exhausted.”).
83

See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992) (suggesting that agencies should
have the chance to correct disputes before the courts take over); McKart v. United States, 395
U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (“A primary purpose [of the exhaustion requirement] is, of course, the
avoidance of premature interruption of the administrative process.”); accord 141 CONG. REC.
26,554 (1995) (“In many jurisdictions . . . judicial orders entered under Federal law have
effectively turned control of the prison systems away from elected officials accountable to the
taxpayer, and over to the courts.”).
84

See McKart, 395 U.S. at 194; STEIN ET AL., supra note 82, at 49-3.
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exhaustion requirement.85 The second change requires exhaustion of all federal
claims.86 Prior to the enactment of the PLRA, section 1997e(a) applied only to
actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.87 After enactment, however, the
exhaustion requirement applied to “all other Federal laws.”88 In enacting this
change, Congress sought to deter all frivolous lawsuits, not just those filed under
section 1983.89 The third change limited the scope of section 1997e(a) by only
requiring exhaustion when prisoners’ brought actions “with respect to prison
conditions.”90 Because Congress failed to define “prison conditions” in section
1997e, conflict and confusion have arisen regarding the applicability of section
1997e(a) to excessive force actions.91
III. THE CONFLICT AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS
Congress failed to define the phrase “prison conditions” in section 1997e(a). As
a result, the circuits are split as to whether excessive force claims are subject to the
exhaustion requirement.92 Because the term “prison conditions” is only defined in 18

85
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1)
(1994). In general, courts do not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies prior to
filing a civil suit in federal court. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 507-08
(1982). However, because prisoner-plaintiffs are different than law-abiding citizens, the
PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before entering court. See id.
86

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).

87

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994). Section 1997e(a)(1) states:
Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any action brought pursuant to section
1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. §1983) by an adult
convicted of a crime confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, the
court shall, if the court believes that such a requirement would be appropriate and in
the interests of justice, continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety days in
order to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative
remedies as are available.
Id.
88

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).

89

141 CONG. REC. 14,573 (1995).

90

Compare § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V 2000) with § 1997e(a)(1) (1994).

91

See supra note 11.

92

Compare Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 2001), Higginbottom v. Carter,
223 F.3d 1259, 1260 (11th Cir. 2000), Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999),
Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 299 (3d Cir. 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 532 U.S. 731
(2001), Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998), and Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d
1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1997) (requiring exhaustion), with Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 106
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter, 532 U.S. at 1065 (finding exhaustion not
required).
There are some notable district court cases also. Compare Serrano v. Alvarado, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 14, 16 (D.P.R. 2001), Castillo v. Buday, 85 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
Johnson v. Garraghty, 57 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326-28 (E.D. Va. 1999), Beeson v. Fishkill Corr.
Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), and Moore v. Smith, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1360,
1363 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding exhaustion required), with Giannattasio v. Artuz, No. 97 Civ.
7606, 2000 WL 335242, at *11-*12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000), Wright v. Dee, 54 F. Supp. 2d
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U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2), the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have used
section 3626(g)(2) to categorize excessive force as a “prison condition.”93 These
Circuits have required prisoner litigants, claiming excessive force, to exhaust
administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court.94 The Second Circuit,
however, disagrees with this approach, and uses the structure, purpose, and
legislative history of the PLRA to find that excessive force is not a “prison
condition.”95 In Nussle v. Willette, the Second Circuit held that excessive force
claims are not subject to the administrative exhaustion requirement.96 In response to
the apparent conflict among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
case Porter v. Nussle.97
A. The Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits Require Exhaustion
1. Freeman v. Francis
98

In Freeman v. Francis, the plaintiff brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claiming that he sustained a shoulder injury after an assault by a corrections
officer.99 The plaintiff argued that an excessive force claim was not subject to the
exhaustion requirement because excessive force claims are not encompassed by the
term “prison conditions” as used in section 1997e(a).100 The Sixth Circuit rejected
this argument and held that excessive force claims are subject to 1997e(a)’s
exhaustion requirement.101
The Sixth Circuit gave three particular reasons for requiring exhaustion. First,
the court indicated that “prison conditions” was not defined in section 1997e(a), but
was defined in another section of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626.102 This section states
199, 205-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), Baskerville v. Goord, No. 97 Civ. 6413, 1998 WL 778396, at
*2-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1998), White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305, 316 (D.N.J. 1998),
Johnson v. O’Malley, No. 96 Civ. 6598, 1998 WL 292421, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 1998), and
Morgan v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 976 F. Supp. 892, 895-96 (D. Az. 1997) (finding exhaustion
not required).
93

Smith, 255 F.3d at 452; Higginbottom, 223 F.3d at 1260; Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644;
Booth, 206 F.3d at 299.
94
See Smith, 255 F.3d at 453; Higginbottom, 223 F.3d at 1261; Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644;
Booth, 206 F.3d at 298. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held that excessive force actions
are subject to the exhaustion requirements of section 1997e(a) without supplying in depth
discussions behind their conclusions. See Wendell, 162 F.3d at 889, 891-92; Garrett, 127 F.3d
at 1264-66.
95

Nussle, 224 F.3d at 97-106.

96

Id. at 106.

97

Porter v. Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).

98

196 F.3d at 641.

99

Id. at 642-43.

100

Id. at 643.

101

Id. at 644.

102

Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 643-44 (6th Cir. 1999).
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that claims regarding “prison conditions” are “any civil proceeding ... with respect to
conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the
lives of confined persons.”103 The Sixth Circuit applied the second part of the
statute, the part following “or,” and found that claims of excessive force are “prison
conditions” and thus, are subject to the exhaustion requirement of section
1997e(a).104
Next, the court articulated that the purpose of the PLRA also supports the
conclusion that the phrase “prison conditions” includes excessive force claims.105
The PLRA was enacted to help deter prisoners from filing frivolous lawsuits, as well
as to reduce the federal courts’ micromanagement over prison systems.106 The
exhaustion requirement furthers these two purposes. First, exhaustion requires
prisoners to submit their complaints to the prison’s administration.107 This process
helps eliminate the frivolous lawsuits before they have the possibility of reaching
court.108 Second, the exhaustion requirement gives prison administrations the power
to render decisions regarding prisoner complaints.109 This process gives a prison a
chance to correct problems before a complaint reaches federal court.110
Consequently, the power to run the prisons is reverted back to the prison
administrations.
Third, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that a Supreme Court case, decided before the
PLRA was enacted, already held that excessive force claims are included as “prison
conditions.”111 In McCarthy v. Bronson, 112 the Supreme Court held that the statutory
language “prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement” includes both
continuous practices and individual acts of wrongdoing, such as a claim of assault.113
By using the Supreme Court’s decision in McCarthy, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that if the “conditions of confinement” language was enough for McCarthy to
encompass excessive force claims, then surely the definition of “prison
conditions”—“effects of actions by government officials”—includes claims of
excessive force.114 The court reasoned that a plain reading of the definition of
“prison conditions” more closely relates to individual acts of wrongdoing than
“conditions of confinement.”115 Therefore, if the term “conditions of confinement”
103

42 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).

104

Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

See Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644.

109

Id.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

500 U.S. 136 (1991).

113

Id. at 139-43.

114

See Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644.

115

Id.
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includes individual acts of excessive force, then surely the term “prison conditions”
encompasses excessive force claims.116
2. Booth v. Churner
117

In Booth v. Churner, the Third Circuit followed the Sixth Circuit and held that
excessive force claims are “prison conditions” as used in section 1997e(a).118 Like
the Sixth Circuit in Freeman, the Third Circuit relied on the statutory definition of
“prison conditions” in section 3636 of the PLRA.119 Also, like Freeman, the court
relied on McCarthy v. Bronson.120 Booth, however, also rebutted an argument that
the Supreme Court concluded that the term “prison conditions” does not include
excessive force claims.121
In Booth, the plaintiff argued that the court should follow the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Farmer v. Brennan122 and Hudson v. McMillian.123 The plaintiff claimed
that in these two cases, the Supreme Court treated “prison conditions” claims and
excessive force claims differently, and if Congress intended to eliminate the
distinction between “prison conditions” and excessive force claims it would have
done so in the PLRA.124 The Third Circuit found this argument flawed for a number
of reasons. First, Congress made its intent clear regarding the definition of “prison
conditions” in section 3626.125 Therefore, applying the common law meaning of
“conditions of confinement” is unnecessary and inappropriate.126 Second, the Third
Circuit argued that applying Farmer and Hudson is inappropriate because courts
determine Congress’ intent in enacting the statute, not the intent of the Supreme
Court in interpreting similar, but not identical terms.127 For all these reasons, the
Third Circuit in Booth concluded that claims of excessive force are encompassed by
the term “prison conditions” and therefore, must be administratively exhausted.128

116

Id.

117

Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 532 U.S.
731 (2001).
118

Id.

119

Id. at 294-95.

120

Id. at 295-96.

121

Id. at 297-98.

122

511 U.S. 825 (1994).

123

503 U.S. 1 (1992).

124

Booth, 206 F.3d at 297.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 297.

127

Id.

128

Booth, 206 F.3d at 290.
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3. Smith v. Zachary
In Smith v. Zachary, the Seventh Circuit took a more defensive approach in
reaching its conclusion that excessive force claims are included as “prison
conditions.” In Smith, the plaintiff argued that since in section 1997e(a) the word
“conditions” is plural, it does not include an individual event such as an assault.129
The court quickly rebutted this claim by quoting the opening section of the United
States Code: “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the
context indicates otherwise ... words importing the plural include the singular.”130
The court also noted, “[g]iven that part of a prison guard’s job is to control inmates,
the use of excessive force in achieving this end can be viewed as a management
failure, not only as a random act of violence.”131 Hence, the court concluded that
claims of excessive force are encompassed by the term “prisons conditions” because
the use of excessive force can be the result of an ongoing condition at the prison.132
The Seventh Circuit also rebutted the prisoners’ assertions by pointing out the
positive attributes of the exhaustion requirement. First, the court noted that requiring
excessive force claims to be administratively exhausted allows prisons to address
problems internally, as well as to insure the prisoner’s safety more quickly.133 Also,
the court indicated that after a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies, the
prisoner has a factual record to take with him if he chooses to file in federal court.134
Finally, the court observed that the exhaustion requirement does not bar a prisoner
from filing suit in federal court.135 Instead, the exhaustion requirement only creates a
necessary prerequisite.136 For all these reasons, the court concluded that the
exhaustion requirement could help prisoners, rather than hurt them.137
The Seventh Circuit made additional observations before rendering its final
judgment. The court noticed that even though the Supreme Court in Booth v.
Churner did not address the excessive force issue specifically, the Court required the
prisoner’s claim of excessive force to be administratively exhausted.138 The Seventh
Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court, by dismissing the case prior to
determining the issue of excessive force, implied that excessive force claims are
subject to the exhaustion requirement. 139 Finally, the Seventh Circuit addressed the
plaintiff’s suggestion that excessive force claims should be an exception to the

129

Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2001).

130

Id. at 449.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Smith, 255 F.3d at 450-51.

134

Id. at 451.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Smith, 255 F.3d at 451.

138

Id. at 452.

139

Id.
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exhaustion requirement.140 The court quickly turned down this suggestion by stating
“an exception for particularized instances of force directed at a specific inmate ... is a
cumbersome test to apply.”141 After making these final observations, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that claims of excessive force are “prison conditions” and thus,
must be administratively exhausted.142
B. The Second Circuit Does Not Require Exhaustion
The Second Circuit, in Nussle v. Willette, put a kink in what seemed to be a
consensus among the circuits. In Nussle, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against two
corrections officers alleging excessive use of physical force under the Eighth
Amendment.143 The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff’s excessive force claim
was not subject to the exhaustion requirement of 1997e(a).144
The Second Circuit discussed five specific reasons for not requiring excessive
force claims to be administratively exhausted. First, the court looked to the statutory
text of section 1997e(a) to determine the meaning of the phrase “prison conditions.”
Even though “prison conditions” is not defined anywhere in section 1997, the court
stated that the text itself suggests that particular instances of excessive force are
included as “prison conditions.”145 “The use of the term prison conditions” in section
1997e(a) would appear to refer to “circumstances affecting everyone in the area
affected by them, rather than ‘single or momentary matters,’ such as beatings or
assaults, that are directed at particular individuals.”146 The court reasoned that a
claim of excessive force is a singular event directed at one prisoner, while the term
“prison conditions” refers to ongoing practices that affect a number of prisoners.147
Therefore, the Second Circuit concluded, excessive force claims are not
encompassed by the term “prison conditions.”148
Second, the court refused to use section 3626 to define the phrase “prison
conditions.” The court argued, “effects of actions by government officials on the
lives of persons confined in prison,” is such an awkward phrase that ordinarily it
would not be used to depict events of excessive force.149 The court reasoned that no
one would use this roundabout terminology to describe an altercation with a prison
guard.150 As a result, the Second Circuit concluded that by using this language,
140

Id. at 451.

141

Smith, 255 F.3d at 451.

142

Id. at 452.

143

Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter v.
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).
144

Id. at 106.

145

Id. at 101.

146

Id.

147

Nussle, 224 F.3d at 101.

148

Id. at 105.

149

Id. at 102.

150

Id. at 103.
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Congress demonstrated its intention that claims of excessive force are not included
as “prison conditions.”151
Third, the Second Circuit articulated that the structure, purpose and legislative
history of the PLRA suggest that excessive force claims are not subject to the
exhaustion requirement of section 1997e(a). The court first suggested that the
definition of “prison conditions” in section 3626 does not apply to section
1997e(a).152 The court reasoned that Congress had different intentions in enacting
these two provisions. By enacting section 3626, Congress was concerned with
preventing courts from interfering with prison administrations.153 On the other hand,
by enacting section 1997e(a), Congress was concerned with the purpose of “filtering
out frivolous suits administratively.”154 Because the two statutes serve different
purposes, Congress could not have intended to apply the same meaning of “prison
conditions” to section 1997e(a).155 Such an application, would promote an entirely
different purpose than Congress intended for section 1997e(a).156
Fourth, the Second Circuit reasoned that “government officials,” as used in
section 3626(g)(2), is more reasonably understood to apply to administrative
officials, rather than corrections officers or prison employees.157 The court
maintained that the term “officials” refers to policymaking officials, and not
employees, such as corrections officers.158 The court explained that corrections
officers have day-to-day contact with inmates, but have no authority to make
administrative decisions.159 Because corrections officers have no authority to make
administrative decisions they are not “government officials.”160 Therefore, the court
determined, section 3626(g)(2)’s definition of “prison conditions” cannot apply
when a prison guard commits an assault.161
Fifth, the Second Circuit relied on two Supreme Court cases that were decided
prior to the enactment of the PLRA. In Hudson v. McMillian162 and Farmer v.
Brennan,163 the Supreme Court created a distinction between excessive force claims
and “conditions-of-confinement” claims.
The Supreme Court reasoned,

151

Nussle, 244 F.3d at 103.

152

Id.

153

Id. at 103-04.

154

Id. at 103.

155

Nussle, 244 F.3d at 103-04.

156

Id.

157

Id. at 104-05.

158

Id. at 104.

159

Nussle, 244 F.3d at 104.

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

163

511 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994).
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“contemporary standards of decency are violated” by a malicious use of force.164
Whereas, “conditions of confinement” claims are only “deprivations denying the
minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.”165 Hence, a less rigorous showing
of injury is required for claims of excessive force, than for “conditions of
confinement” claims.166 The Second Circuit used the Supreme Court’s analysis and
determined that the term “prison conditions” is substantially related to the term
“conditions of confinement.”167 Therefore, excessive force claims should not be
defined as “prison conditions” and thus, should not be required to be administratively
exhausted.168
Because the Second Circuit has refused to follow the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that excessive force claims are subject to the
exhaustion requirement, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Porter v. Nussle.169
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case is likely to have a substantial effect not
only on prisoners’ excessive force claims, but also on other similar and controversial
prisoner claims, such as unlawful strip searches, sexual assault by prison guards,
unconstitutional denials of medical care, unjustified punishment and retaliation, or
even a failure to provide protection from assault committed by other prisoners.170
IV. THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT INCLUDES EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS
Prisoners claiming excessive force should be required to exhaust all
administrative remedies for a couple of reasons. First, the plain meaning of the
statute suggests an intent to include claims of excessive force in the exhaustion
requirement. Although the term “prison conditions” is not defined in section
1997e(a), section 3626 of the PLRA provides a definition of “prison conditions” and
this definition includes claims of excessive force. Additionally, the purpose and
legislative history of 1997e(a) supports exhaustion of excessive force claims.
Congress made the purposes of the PLRA clear: to reduce frivolous prisoner
litigation, to prevent the federal judiciary from micromanaging prison systems, and
to lessen the burden on the federal docket.171 Requiring exhaustion for excessive
force claims furthers these three purposes. Also, two Supreme Court decisions,
McCarthy v. Bronson and Booth v. Churner, add to the view that the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement includes claims of excessive force. Moreover, requiring
exhaustion of excessive force claims is the most efficient and effective process for
prisoners as well as prison systems and the federal judiciary. For all these reasons,

164

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.

165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter v.
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).
168

Id.

169

Porter v. Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).

170

See Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

171

141 CONG. REC. 26, 548 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 35,980 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,554
(1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,448 (1995).
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prisoners claiming excessive force should be required to exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing suit in federal court.
A. The Definition of “Prison Conditions” Includes the Use of Excessive Force
In applying section 3626(g)(2) to section 1997e(a), one can easily conclude that
Congress intended to include excessive force claims as “prison conditions,” thereby
requiring such claims to be administratively exhausted. First, excessive force claims
are necessarily encompassed by the term “prison conditions.” Congress created
roundabout phraseology—“effects of actions by government officials on the lives of
persons confined in prisons”172—capturing an extensive variety of practices, such as
the use of excessive force. Additionally, the compelling evidence of Congressional
intent also supports the application of section 3626 to define the term “prison
conditions” as used in section 1997e(a). There is no reason to believe that when
Congress enacted the PLRA it meant the term “prison conditions” to mean one thing
in section 3626 and to mean something totally different in the following section.
Also, the similarities in the statutory language of sections 3626 and 1997 illustrate
Congress’ intent to use section 3626 to define “prison conditions” as used in section
1997e(a). For these reasons, one can safely assume that the definition of “prison
conditions” in section 3626(g)(2) necessarily defines the term “prison conditions” as
used in section 1997e(a), and by doing so, requires excessive force claims to be
administratively exhausted.
The phrase “action ... with respect to prison conditions”173 is not defined
anywhere in section 1997e(a). A definition of this phrase, however, is provided in
18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2), which was also enacted as part of the PLRA. Section
3626(g)(2) provides that the phrase:
“civil action with respect to prison conditions” means any civil
proceeding arising under Federal law with respect to the conditions of
confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives
of persons confined in prison, but does not include habeas corpus
proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison[.]174
According to the rule on statutory construction, when Congress uses the same
term in two different places of the same statute, those terms should be interpreted to
have similar meanings.175 Accordingly, in order to determine if excessive force
claims are subject to the exhaustion requirement of 1997e(a), one should follow the
172

18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).

173

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).

174

18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).

175

Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260 (1993) (“We certainly agree with
petitioners that language used in one portion of a statute . . . should be deemed to have the
same meaning as the same language used elsewhere in the statute.”); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496
U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (quoting Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986))
(“The substantial relation between the two programs presents a classic case for application of
the ‘normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the
same act are intended to have the same meaning.’”); Baggett v. First Nat’l Bank of
Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1350 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Well-established canon of statutory
construction [is] that words have the same meaning throughout a given statute.”).
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rules governing statutory construction and look to section 3626(g)(2) to determine
the meaning of “prison conditions.”176
By applying 3626(g)(2) to section 1997e(a), one can easily conclude that
Congress intended to include excessive force claims as “prison conditions.” Courts
have routinely separated section 3626(g)(2) into two prongs: (1) any action “with
respect to the conditions of confinement;” or (2) “the effects of actions by
government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison.”177 As the Third
Circuit in Booth pointed out, the “conditions of confinement” language includes
complaints regarding “the environment in which the prisoners live, the physical
conditions of that environment, and the nature of the services provided therein.”178
Therefore, claims of excessive force do not “naturally fall into” the first prong of
section 3626(g)(2).179
One can argue, however, that the second prong of 3626(g)(2) encompasses
claims of excessive force. This prong defines “prison conditions” as “the effects of
actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison.”180 The
use of excessive force on a prisoner is an action by a government official: correction
officers are governmental employees who run the day-to-day aspects of a prison,
such as protecting prisoners from each other and controlling the order of the prison
as a whole.181 Therefore, a correction officer is a government official.182 Moreover,
the use of excessive force by a prison guard unavoidably has an effect on the life of a
prisoner. As the court in Booth suggested, excessive force makes a prisoner’s life
worse in the same way as intentionally denying “a prisoner inmate food, heating or
medical attention.”183 For these reasons, excessive force claims are necessarily
encompassed by the term “prison conditions,” and as a result, must be
administratively exhausted as required by section 1997e(a).
Despite the logic of this argument, the Second Circuit refused to accept that
excessive force claims are defined by section 3626(g)(2), because “such awkward
language would not, ordinarily, be used to describe such incidents.”184 Specifically,
the court cited Judge Noonan’s argument in Booth that when someone is assaulted,
“no one on earth, educated or uneducated, would use such roundabout phraseology”
as “effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in

176

Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 532
U.S. 731 (2001); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999).
177

See Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2001); Booth, 206 F.3d at 295.

178

Booth, 206 F.3d at 294-95.

179

Id.

180

42 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).

181

See Smith, 255 F.3d at 449; Booth, 206 F.3d at 295.

182

Booth, 206 F.3d at 295.

183

Id.

184

Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter v.
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).
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prison” to express the nature of the assault.185 This argument is impracticable and
unsubstantiated. Judge’s Noonan’s argument works with all types of prisoner
lawsuits, even the frivolous kind. When someone is served chunky peanut butter
instead of creamy, no one would describe this situation as an “effect[] of action[] by
government officials on the lives of persons confined in jail.”186 Congress knew
what it was doing when it used a general phrase to define “prison conditions.”187 If
Congress wanted to exclude acts of excessive force, it could have clarified its intent
by creating a more precise description of “prison conditions.”188 But Congress did
not do that. Instead, Congress created a roundabout phrase that would encompass an
extensive variety of practices, such as the use of excessive force.189
The Second Circuit also maintained that excessive force claims do not fall into
the second category of section 3636(g)(2) because prison guards are not government
officials.190 The court defended its narrow interpretation of section 3626 by pointing
to Congress’ primary purpose in enacting section 3626.191 In enacting section 3626
of the PLRA, Congress sought to prevent the judiciary from interfering with the
management of prison systems and to return to prison administrators the authority to
make the day-to-day decisions.192 Therefore, the court concluded, the term
“government officials” as used in section 3626 only applies to high-ranking prison
officials or “administrative and policymaking officials” and not “lower level
government employees, such as corrections officers[.]”193
Once again, the Second Circuit mistakenly has taken a narrow approach
regarding section 3626(g)(2). If Congress wanted to limit the application to
administrative or policymaking officials, it would have done so by specifically
limiting the provision to “policymaking officials,” as it did in 50 U.S.C. § 4033(b)(5), or by limiting the provision to a “supervisory official,” as it did in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2705(a)(1)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11(a)(4).194 Congress, however, did not

185

Id. at 103 (quoting Judge Noonan in Booth, 206 F.3d at 302 (Noonan, J., concurring and
dissenting)).
186
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, Porter v.
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2002) (No. 00-853).
187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

Nussle, 224 F.3d at 104.

191

Id.

192

Id. at 103-04.

193

Id. at 104.

194

See 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(b)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(1)(B) (1994
& Supp. V 1999); 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11(a)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
50 U.S.C. § 403-3(b)(5) states:
The Director shall make available to the Council such staff as may be necessary to
permit the Council to carry out its responsibilities under this subsection and shall take
appropriate measures to ensure that the Council and its staff satisfy the needs of
policymaking officials and other consumers of intelligence. The Council shall also be
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limit the provision by using the terms “policymaking officials” or “supervisory
officials.” Instead, Congress broadened the provision by using the more general
term “government officials.”195 Therefore, the Second Circuit’s argument that
section 3626(g)(2) does not apply to excessive force claims because corrections
officers are not “government officials” is impracticable and unpersuasive.196
The compelling evidence of congressional intent also supports the application of
section 3626 to define the term “prison conditions” as used in section 1997e(a).
Because “prison conditions” is not defined in section 1997e(a), the close proximity
of section 3626 to section 1997 in the PLRA supports the conclusion that the
definition of “actions with respects to prison conditions” was intended to apply to
section 1997e(a).197 In the PLRA, section 3626 immediately precedes section
1997.198 Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that when Congress enacted the
PLRA, it meant the term “prison conditions” to mean one thing in section 3626 and
to mean something totally different in the following section.199
Also, the similarities between sections 3626 and 1997 illustrate Congress’ intent
to use section 3626 to define “prison conditions” as used in 1997e(a). Both sections
were amended on the same day and as part of the same legislation.200 Additionally,
readily accessible to policymaking officials and other appropriate individuals not
otherwise associated with the intelligence community.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(1)(B) states:
[W]here an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a
Federal or State grand jury subpoena is obtained, delay the notifiication required under
section 2703(b) of this title for a period not to exceed ninety days upon the execution
of a written certification of a supervisory official that there is reason to believe that
notification of the existence of the subpoena may have an adverse result described in
paragraph (2) of this subsection.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11(a)(4) states:
[A] requirement that an application of a warrant to conduct a search governed by this
title be approved by an attorney for the government, except that in an emergency
situation the application may be approved by another appropriate supervisory official
if within 24 hours of such emergency the appropriate United States Attorney is
notified.
Id.
195

See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).

196

The Supreme Court routinely referring to corrections officers as “officials” also
supports this conclusion. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 138 (1991); Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). Even more compelling is the fact that the Supreme Court
has also referred to corrections officers as “government officials.” See Procunier v. Navarette,
434 U.S. 555, 558 n.2 (1978); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 587 (1998).
197

Brief for Petitioners at 21, Porter v. Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001) (No. 00-853).

198

See Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 802-03, 110 Stat.
1321-66 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626); Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 803, 110 Stat. 1321-70 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997).
199
See Brief for Petitioners at 21, Porter, 532 U.S. at 1065 (No. 00-853) (quoting Comm’r
v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996).
200

See Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2001).
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both 3626 and 1997 address the solutions and limitations of prisoner litigation.201
Moreover, as the court in Smith v. Zachary indicated, “[b]oth sections are devoted to
various aspects of prison litigation, including: settlement agreements, the
appointment of special masters, attorneys’ fees awards, the use of telephonic
hearings, waiver, and limitations on recovery.”202 All these similarities suggest that
Congress intended the courts to use section 3626(g)(2) to define the term “prison
conditions” as used in section 1997e(a).
The most compelling similarity between sections 1997e(a) and 3626(g)(2),
however, is that both provisions share the same objective; to deter the federal
judiciary from intervening in the prison systems’ administrative duties. The Second
Circuit in Nussle argued that while section 1997e(a) is concerned with “filtering out
frivolous suits administratively, before they get to court,” section 3626(g)(2) is
“concerned with the different purpose of preventing courts from micromanaging
prison systems.”203 This argument is not persuasive. Section 1997e(a) requires
inmates to use the prison system’s agencies to address their concerns before filing
suit in federal court.204 This exhaustion requirement keeps the federal judiciary from
becoming involved in the administrative processes of the prison until the prison has a
chance to resolve the prisoners’ grievances.205 Also, the exhaustion requirement
gives back to prison administrators the ability to decide matters of routine prison
administration.206 Therefore, because section 1997e(a) also seeks to prevent judicial
interference, there is strong evidence that the Second Circuit misinterpreted the
section when it stated “sections 3626(g)(2) and 1997e(a) advance distinct statutory
purposes.”207
Even if section 3626(g)(2) did not define “prison conditions,” the plain meaning
of section 1997e(a) suggests that excessive force claims are included in the term
“prison conditions” and thus, must be administratively exhausted. The Second
Circuit in Nussle argued that the plural form of the word “conditions” as used in
section 1997e(a) could not denote a single, isolated event such as assault.208 Instead
the word “conditions” signifies “attendant circumstances” or “existing state of
affairs.”209 This argument is flawed for a number of reasons. First, noting the
distinction between plural and singular words is not a commonly used practice of

201

Id. at 448-49.

202

Id. at 449.

203

Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter v.
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).
204

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

205

See Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).

206

See Prieser, 411 U.S. at 492 (“[B]ecause most potential litigation involving . . .
prisoners arises on a day-to-day basis, it is most efficiently and properly handled by the
[prison’s] administrative bodies.”).
207

Nussle, 224 F.3d at 103.

208

Id. at 101.

209

Id. (relying on the definition of “conditions” located at WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 473 (1961)).
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statutory interpretation.210 The United States Code, where section 1997e(a) is
located, expressly states “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
unless the context indicates otherwise ... words importing the plural include the
singular.”211 Applying this rule of construction, one can safely assume that Congress
intended the plural form of “prison conditions” to apply to a singular event such as
assault.
Second, it is not clear that assault claims arise out of a “single or momentary”
event. Instead, the nature of an assault by a prison guard suggests that there are
problems within the prison’s management system.212 As the court in Smith v.
Zachary indicated, “[a]n assault by a prison guard could be a by-product of
systematic problems, including poor hiring practices, insufficient training and
supervision, or an inadequate procedure for responding to prison riots or
insubordinate behavior by prisoners.”213 When examining the term “prison
conditions” in the context of a correctional institution, it is apparent that there is no
distinction between the plural form and the singular form of the word “conditions.”214
Therefore, it is clear from the plain meaning of section 1997e(a) that claims of
excessive force are included in the term “prison conditions” and thus, must be
administratively exhausted.
B. The Purpose and Legislative History of 1997e(a) Supports Exhaustion of
Excessive Force Claims
Not only does the definition of “prison conditions” and the plain meaning of
section 1997e(a) suggest that excessive force claims must be administratively
exhausted, but the purpose and legislative history of the PLRA illustrates Congress’
intention to require exhaustion of excessive force claims. The general rule on
statutory interpretation requires an interpreter to first rely on plain text to determine
the meaning and purpose of a statute.215 Then, if the statute is ambiguous, an
interpreter can look to the statute’s legislative history.216 Despite the apparent
clarity of the term “prison conditions,” some courts have consulted the legislative
210
Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:34 (6th ed. 2000)).
211

1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).

212

Smith, 255 F.3d at 449.

213

Id.

214

Id.

215
See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 271 (2000) (“In analyzing a statute, we begin
by examining the text, not by ‘psychoanalyzing those who enacted it.’”); FDIC v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (“In the absence of such a definition, we construe a statutory term in
accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.”); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253-54 (1992) (“We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”); John
Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1373,
1374 (1992) (stating that the first step in statutory interpretation is to read the statute).
216
See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991); Crandon v. United States, 494
U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (interpreting a statute also requires courts to look to the “object and
policy” of the statute).
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history of the PLRA.217 Yet, the purpose and legislative history of the PLRA also
support the conclusion that Congress intended the exhaustion requirement to
encompass excessive force claims.
1. Congress’ Purpose of Deterring Frivolous Prisoner Litigation Requires
Exhaustion
By requiring exhaustion, Congress intended, in part, to reduce the number of
frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners.218 Because excessive force claims can also be
frivolous, Congress must have intended these claims be exhausted as well.219
Prisoners can allege they were exposed to malicious nudges, 220 or that a loud
reprimand by a prison guard is an unnecessary use of force. The prisoner could even
claim an offensive glance by a prison guard is harassment.221 The possibilities of
frivolous excessive force claims are infinite.222 Therefore, allowing an excessive
force exception to the exhaustion requirement would undermine Congress’ intention
of reducing the number of frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners.223
Congress’ use of statistical studies also demonstrates its intent to include
excessive force claims in the exhaustion requirement. Congress used statistical
studies to support its claim that most prisoner lawsuits are frivolous and burdensome
upon the federal judiciary.224 These studies made no distinction between excessive
force claims and other conditions of confinement claims.225 By failing to make this
distinction, Congress projected its view that any federal law claim has the potential
to be frivolous.226 Thus, in order to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits, it is
reasonable to conclude that Congress required all federal claims, including excessive
force claims, to be administratively exhausted.
Moreover, creating an exception for excessive force claims would frustrate
Congress’ goal of reducing the federal judiciary’s burden of prisoner litigation.
Commentators that refuse to require exhaustion believe that a distinction should be
made between excessive force claims resulting from ongoing conditions, and
excessive force claims resulting from specific acts of alleged misconduct.227 This
approach, however, would generate an additional amount of work for the district

217
See Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 103-06 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom,
Porter v. Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).
218

See discussion supra Part II.B.

219

See Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2001).

220

Id. at 452.

221

Id.

222

Id.

223

Id.

224

See 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995).

225

See id.

226

Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter v.
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).
227

See Willette, 244 F.3d at 102-03.
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courts.228 Courts would first have to determine if claims of excessive force are
ongoing conditions or single acts of misconduct.229 Because this distinction would
be difficult to recognize, unnecessary prisoner litigation would continually burden
the federal judiciary.230
2. Exhaustion Furthers the PLRA’s Purpose of Preventing Judicial
Micromanagement Over Prison Administrations
Reducing the amount of frivolous suits was not Congress’ only concern when
amending section 1997e(a). By amending 1997e(a), Congress also plainly intended
to prevent federal courts from interfering with the management of prison systems.231
In 1996, Congress created a subsection to 1997e, which dealt directly with frivolous
prisoner litigation.232 This subsection, 1997e(c), gave the courts the power to dismiss
suits that were frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a cause of action.233 If 1997e’s
only objective was to avoid frivolous litigation, then Congress need not go further.234
Congress, however, continued by amending section 1997e(a) to require exhaustion
of all federal claims.235 Therefore, when Congress amended 1997e(a), it sought not
only to bar frivolous prisoner litigation, but also, to reduce the federal judiciary’s
intervention into the nation’s prison systems by allowing prison administrators to try
to resolve meritorious claims first.
Finally, an exception to the exhaustion requirement would undermine Congress’
objective of reducing the intervention of federal courts into the management of
prison systems. An exception for excessive force claims would require a two-step
process. First, the adjudicator would have to decide whether a particular claim arose
out of an ongoing condition or a specific act of alleged misconduct.236 Then, if the
228

See Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

229

See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 143 (1991).

230

Id.

231

See discussion supra Part II.B.

232

See Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 2001).

233

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (1994 & Supp. 1999). Section 1997e(c) states:
The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of
the United States (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief, the court may dismiss the underlying claim without first
requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Id.
234

Smith, 255 F.3d at 451.

235

Id.

236

See Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom,
Porter v. Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).
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adjudicator decided that the claim was the result of a specific act, the adjudicator
would have another decision regarding the claim’s legal merit.237 This long and
difficult two-step process is not a question of fact that could be determined by prison
administrations.238 Instead, the process is one of legal analysis, which requires the
legal expertise of the federal judiciary.239 Consequently, an excessive force
exception would defeat the purpose of the exhaustion requirement because the
federal judiciary would have to supervise the prison’s activities before the prison had
a chance to resolve the conflict.240 Therefore, an exception for excessive force
claims would defeat the PLRA’s purpose of preventing the federal judiciary from
interfering with prison’s administrative processes.
The purpose and legislative history of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
supports the conclusion that Congress intended to include claims of excessive force.
When Congress amended section 1997e(a), it expressly stated that the purpose of the
PLRA amendments was to prevent frivolous prisoner litigation and the federal
courts’ micromanagement over prison systems. Creating an exception for excessive
force claims would defeat these two purposes. Therefore, when Congress broadened
section 1997e(a), it deliberately created a comprehensive exhaustion requirement
that would include claims of excessive force.
C. Two Supreme Court Decisions Add to the View that the PLRA’s Exhaustion
Requirement Includes Claims of Excessive Force
Two Supreme Court cases confirm the notion that section 1997e(a) requires
prisoners to exhaust all administrative procedures before filing excessive force
claims in federal court. McCarthy v. Bronson241 stands for the proposition that if
Congress intended the narrower term “conditions of confinement” to include
excessive force claims, then surely the broader term “prison conditions” includes
claims of excessive force.242 Therefore, claims of excessive force must be
administratively exhausted because claims regarding “prison conditions” are subject
to exhaustion. Additionally, although the Supreme Court in Booth v. Churner did
not address the specific issue of an excessive force claim’s subjection to exhaustion,
by dismissing the case prior to determining the excessive force issue, the Court
created a presumption that the PLRA requires exhaustion of excessive force claims.
These reasons support the conclusion that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
McCarthy and Booth create a strong presumption that prisoners’ excessive force
claims are subject to the exhaustion requirement.
1. McCarthy v. Bronson
The Supreme Court’s decision in McCarthy v. Bronson adds to the view that the
exhaustion requirement includes claims of excessive force. In McCarthy, a prisoner
237

See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 143 (1991).

238

Id.

239

Id.

240

Id.

241

500 U.S. 136 (1991).

242

See id.
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brought a federal action claiming a correction officer exerted excessive force when
he transferred the prisoner between cells.243 The District Court found in favor of the
officers and the prisoner appealed, challenging the court’s referral of the case to a
magistrate for findings of fact and recommendation of disposition.244 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision.245 On writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, and held that the statutory
language “prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement” included both
ongoing practices and isolated acts of misconduct, such as assault.246 Therefore, the
court concluded, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the District Court could refer the
prisoners’ excessive force claim to the magistrate judge because the term “conditions
of confinement” necessarily includes claims of excessive force.247
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, offered a number of logical reasons for
including excessive force claims into the phrase “conditions of confinement.” First,
Justice Stevens noted that a broad reading of the term “conditions of confinement” is
appropriate when determining its proper meaning.248 The Court conceded that the
“most natural reading” of the term “conditions of confinement” would not include
isolated events, such as claims of excessive force.249 The Court noted, however, that
the term “conditions of confinement” should not be read “in isolation.”250 The Court
explained that reading the term in its entirety suggests Congress’ intent to include all
prisoner petitions, not just claims alleging ongoing or continuous misconduct.251 In
justifying its position, the Court relied on its decision in Preiser v. Rodriguez.252 In
this case, the Supreme Court held that specific instances of misconduct were
encompassed by the term “conditions of confinement.”253 For these reasons, the
Supreme Court in McCarthy also concluded, the term “conditions of confinement”
naturally encompasses “single episode cases,” such as an assault.254
The Court also used Congressional intent behind the amendment to the
Magistrate’s Act to support its conclusion. The Court reasoned that Congress
emphasized greater utilization of magistrates in order to lessen the federal dockets’
burden.255 The Court deduced that a definition of “conditions of confinement”

243

Id. at 138.

244

Id.

245

Id.

246

McCarthy, 500 U.S. at 142-44.

247

Id. at 139.

248

Id.

249

Id.

250

McCarthy, 500 U.S. at 139.

251

Id.

252

411 U.S. 475 (1982).

253

Id. at 498-99.

254

McCarthy, 500 U.S. at 143.

255

Id. at 142.
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similar to the one used by the Supreme Court in Preiser, is consistent with Congress’
rationale because it permits referrals of an extensive group of cases.256 The Court
clarified its position by noting that a simpler reading of “conditions of confinement”
would “avoid[] the litigation that otherwise would inevitably arise when trying to
identify the precise contours of [a] petitioner’s suggested exception for single
episode cases.”257 In other words, the Court suggested, an interpretation of the
definition to exclude isolated events “would generate additional work for the district
courts because the distinction between cases challenging ongoing conditions and
those challenging specific acts of alleged misconduct will often be difficult to
identify.”258 Therefore, the Court concluded, the only way to avoid the inevitable
burden on the federal dockets would be to include a broad category of prisoner
actions, including claims regarding isolated events of misconduct, such as assault.259
By defining the term “prison conditions” in section 3626 of the PLRA, Congress
intended to circumvent the “plain meaning problem” in McCarthy by clarifying its
intent to require administrative exhaustion of all prisoner claims, including claims of
excessive force.260 Congress used a two-part test in defining the term “prison
conditions.” And as noted earlier, the Supreme Court in McCarthy already
interpreted the first part of the definition, “conditions of confinement” to encompass
all prisoner petitions, even those claiming isolated events of misconduct, such as
excessive force.261 Congress, however, in a broadening effort, also included the
phrase “effects of actions by government officials,” which even more closely
describes isolated events of misconduct than the term “conditions of confinement.”262
Therefore, by covering all areas of ambiguity, Congress has created a strong
presumption that it intended the term “prison conditions” to include isolated events
of misconduct, such as claims of excessive force.263
2. Booth v. Churner
The Supreme Court’s decision in Booth v. Churner also confirms the notion that
claims of excessive force should be administratively exhausted prior to filing suit in
federal court. In Booth, the plaintiff filed an action alleging excessive force by
prison officials.264 The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s ruling that an
inmate was required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal
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court even where the inmate sought only money damages, which were not available
through the prison administrative process.265
The Seventh Circuit in Smith v. Zachary noticed that, although the Supreme
Court in Booth did not address the specific issue of an excessive force claims’
subjection to exhaustion, the Court created a presumption, by dismissing the case
prior to determining the excessive force issue, that the PLRA requires exhaustion of
excessive force claims.266
Also, in addition to this general observation, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Booth can be likened to the present issue plaguing the courts—whether the PLRA
requires claims of excessive force to be administratively exhausted. In reaching its
conclusion, the Supreme Court in Booth explained that the amendments to 1997e(a)
specifically require prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies, where as prior to
the amendments, the federal judiciary used its discretion in requiring exhaustion.267
The Court noted that section 1997e(a) was amended in this way in order to subject
prisoners’ actions to the exhaustion requirement.268 The Court stated that by doing
so, Congress intended to deter frivolous claims and promote better-organized
litigation once a dispute transferred to court.269 Therefore, the Court reasoned, an
exception would not support Congress’ true intent.270
The reasoning behind the decision in Booth can be logically equated to the issue
of whether claims of excessive force are encompassed by the exhaustion
requirement. As stated throughout this Note, an exception to the exhaustion
requirement for excessive force claims would require a judge to decipher whether the
alleged misconduct was ongoing and continuous or an isolated event.271 As the
Court in Booth so eloquently stated, exhaustion is no longer the courts’ decision.272
Therefore, courts should not interfere with the exhaustion process by creating an
exception, with such blurred lines, that could only be identified by a judiciary. Also,
on the same grounds, an exception for excessive force claims would not deter
frivolous litigation or cultivate better-prepared litigation. For all these reasons, one
could fairly interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in Booth to require prisoners to
exhaust all administrative remedies prior to filing an excessive force claim in federal
court.
The Supreme Court in McCarthy v. Bronson, in holding that claims of excessive
force are included in the term “conditions of confinement,” created a presumption
that claims of excessive force are also “prison conditions” as defined in section
3626(g)(2) and therefore, are subject to the exhaustion requirement.273 Additionally,
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the Supreme Court in Booth v. Churner created a presumption that excessive force
claims are subject to the exhaustion requirement by dismissing the case prior to
deciding whether an excessive force claim is included in the exhaustion
requirement.274 For these reasons, one can safely presume that excessive force
claims are included in the term “prison conditions” and thus, are subject to the
exhaustion requirement.
D. Efficiency Requires Exhaustion of Excessive Force Claims
Requiring exhaustion of excessive force claims is the most efficient and effective
process. Because a lawsuit is very expensive and time consuming, a prisoner may
prefer an administrative adjudication before a judicial proceeding. Additionally, the
federal judiciary benefits greatly from the decreasing amount of civil litigation.
Also, administrative adjudication can prove to be extremely valuable to the nation’s
prisons because such institutions regain the power over day-to-day decisions.
Moreover, Congressional goals of deterring frivolous prisoner litigation and
preventing courts from interfering with prisons’ administrative procedures are met.
For all these reasons, the only efficient and effective process is to require exhaustion
of excessive force claims.
Prisoners can still file a lawsuit in federal court. Some commentators have
argued that requiring prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies bars a prisoner’s
constitutional right of access to the courts.275 This argument, however, lacks merit.
Requiring administrative review does not prohibit a prisoner’s ability to file suit; it
simply establishes a prerequisite.276 If the prisoner’s claim cannot be resolved
appropriately at the administrative level, the prisoner is still able to file suit in federal
court.277
In fact, for a variety of reasons, a prisoner with a legitimate challenge will
probably prefer an administrative adjudication over a judicial proceeding. Litigation
in courts can take months, even years to complete, which can prove to be
burdensome for the prisoner financially.278 More importantly, judicial proceedings
produce results years later.279 Therefore, a more expeditious proceeding, such as an
administrative adjudication, can prove to be extremely advantageous for an inmate’s
overall welfare, especially for those inmates claiming excessive force.280 The
administrative procedure forces the prison to justify or explain its internal
procedures, which in turn, allows prisons to address the problem quickly.281 The
274
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prison system can reprimand or even discharge employees who improperly exert
excessive force upon a prisoner.282 Also, the prison administration could provide a
prisoner with monetary remedies or even protection from the abusers fairly rapidly
after the misconduct occurred, as opposed to years later if a judicial proceeding was
entered.283 For all these reasons, exhaustion of administrative remedies is incredibly
helpful for all inmates.
The federal judiciary also benefits from the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.
Administrative agencies can provide useful records that prove to be enormously
useful for future litigation in court.284 Such records focus more clearly on the issues
at hand.285 Also, these records present the arguments more coherently and
comprehensively – one of the major concerns that plagued the courts prior to the
enactment of the PLRA.286 Moreover, the administrative process affords district
courts more time to address serious concerns.287 By requiring exhaustion, more cases
are resolved at the administrative level, thereby clearing up the federal judiciary’s
dockets.288 Therefore, the federal court can spend more time with the meritful and
complex cases, such as cases involving the use of excessive force.
Administrative adjudication can prove to be valuable for the prison
administrations as well. First, requiring exhaustion prevents outside interference by
the federal judiciary into the prison’s administrative procedures, thereby allowing the
prison system to exercise the authority granted to it by the PLRA.289 Moreover, by
requiring exhaustion, the prison administration is able to preserve financial resources
because the agency avoids the heavy costs of defending excessive force suits in
Cir. 1999) (“Prisons need to know about and address claims of excessive force as they would
any other claim concerning prison life so that steps may be taken to stop problems
immediately if they exist.”).
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federal court.290 For these reasons, the most efficient process for prisoner grievances
is the administrative process.
The apparent benefit of requiring exhaustion is to achieve Congress’ goals of
deterring frivolous prisoner litigation and minimizing the courts interference in the
prisons administrative procedures. Perhaps, the exhaustion requirement’s most
effective achievement is meeting these Congressional goals. By enacting the PLRA,
Congress hoped to deter frivolous prisoner litigation.291 The exhaustion requirement
accomplished this pursuit.292 Administrative adjudication helps weed out frivolous
suits, which in turn, lessens the burden on the courts, thereby affording the court
more time to hear meritful prisoner claims.293 Additionally, exhaustion requires
prisoners to take their claims to the administrative procedure first, which returns the
administrative power back to the prisons.294 Therefore, by meeting the intended
goals of Congress, the exhaustion requirement has proved to be both efficient and
effective.
Efficiency and effectiveness demand the courts to disallow any exceptions for the
exhaustion requirement. The exhaustion requirement proves to be extremely
beneficial, not only for the federal judiciary and the prison administrations, but also
for the prisoner. Also, Congressional goals, by themselves, provide enough reasons
for requiring excessive force claims to be administratively exhausted. For these
reasons, the only efficient and effective process is the administrative grievance
process.
V. CONCLUSION
In an effort to halt the enormous trend of frivolous prisoner litigation and the
overabundance of judicial interference into the American prison systems, Congress
enacted a necessary and appropriate piece of legislation, the Prisoner Litigation
Reform Act. Despite the apparent clarity of the legislation, conflict has arisen
among the Appellate Courts regarding the exhaustion requirement.
The Supreme Court should settle the apparent conflict among the circuits by
requiring all prisoner claims to be administratively exhausted, even claims of
excessive force. The Court should follow the definition of “prison conditions”
provided in section 3626(g)(2) of the PLRA because Congressional intent, as well as
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Supreme Court precedent, supports applying section 3626’s definition of “prison
conditions.” By applying this definition, acts of excessive force would fall into the
category of “prison conditions,” and as such, claims of excessive force would require
exhaustion.
Additionally, requiring exhaustion of excessive force claims is the most efficient
and effective process, not only for the prison administrations and the federal
judiciary, but also for the prisoner. Moreover, exhaustion of excessive force claims
furthers Congressional goals of deterring frivolous prisoner litigation, preventing
judicial micromanagement over prisons, lessening the burden on the federal docket,
and decreasing the waste of taxpayer dollars. For all these reasons, the Supreme
Court should find that the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA requires all federal
claims to be administratively exhausted before filing suit in federal court, even
claims of excessive force.
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